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Intellectual property frequently carries with it exclusive rights not only over 
the primary subject matter of the rights granted, but also over ancillary 
subject matter that is not within the definition of the primary grant, as for 
example in the patent doctrine of contributory infringement.  Previous 
scholars have explored the potential for intellectual property rights to affect 
the size and structure of firms by mitigating transaction costs both between 
firms and within firms. Here we extend that framework to consider the 
impact of ancillary rights, which we expect to have their own effects on a 
firm’s “make or buy” decision. Ancillary rights may place an intellectual 
property holder in a position to license production of complementary 
products or components to other firms. In some instances the absence of 
ancillary rights may prompt firms to vertically integrate, in order to bring 
such transactions in house. We also anticipate that doctrines such as 
contributory infringement impact employee mobility out of firms holding 
patents. We anticipate that contributory infringement rights will tend to 
lower overall transaction costs, although this may vary with the 
circumstances in a particular industry. 
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 Over the past several decades, the work of economist Ronald Coase has had an enormous 
impact on our conception of law and our understanding of how it operates.  Among the many 
influential ideas developed by Coase, one of the most influential has been his concept of the 
theory of the firm, a transactions cost analysis that illuminates and explains the size and structure 
of commercial businesses.
1
  Coase’s insight, and the work that has built upon it, has become a 
mainstay of corporate and business law analysis.   
 
 More recently, it has become the subject of discussion among intellectual property 
scholars, who have begun to use it as a tool to better understand the role of intellectual property 
(IP) in modern commercial firms.  A number of scholars have suggested ways in which 
intellectual property may lower transaction costs, and so, all other factors being equal, alter the 
size or structure of modern firms.
2
  In previous work we have added to that discussion by 
integrating analyses of the effects of intellectual property rights on both the internal and external 
transactions costs experienced by firms.
3
  We have argued that intellectual property rights 
simultaneously mediate the cost of both inter-firm and intra-firm transactions, which in turn 
affects the boundary between the firm and the market.
4
  We have discussed these effects with 




 In this paper we extend that analysis.  Here we apply this framework to a recurring 
peculiarity found in intellectual property law: the incorporation within intellectual property 
protection of rights to items and activities that are not within the intellectual property grant 
proper.  We adopt as our vehicle a particular doctrinal instance drawn from patent law.  In patent 
law, the scope of the patent owner’s rights is defined by the patent’s claims
6
, and the law of 
patents generally asserts that inventions falling outside the claims are dedicated to the public 
unless covered by the claims of a different patent.  Nonetheless, patent owners sometimes have 
under the law of contributory infringement the ability to control items that are clearly outside the 
patent claims. 
 
 We by no means intend to suggest that this rights structure is entirely unique to 
intellectual property.  Physical property rights may carry with them associated ancillary rights 
that extend beyond the boundaries of the property, in order to ensure the use or enjoyment of the 
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primary property grant.  The boundaries of real property are, for example, typically defined by a 
deed that uses natural markers, survey data, or other empirical criteria to delineate the boundaries 
of the parcel of land.  The holder of title typically controls the use and disposition of resources 
within the boundary line, and typically does not control activities or resources outside the 
property line.  But sometimes the land owner’s rights may go further; for example, the law of 
nuisance may prohibit activities on an adjacent plot that would generate noise or onto blow dust 
onto the parcel in question.
7
  In such instances, the law of real property effectively extends the 
rights of the owner of one parcel of real property into another parcel that he ostensibly does not 
own. 
 
 But in the case of intellectual property, ancillary rights may operate at a considerable 
distance, impacting entirely separate markets.  Our interest here is to investigate how such 
ancillary rights in intellectual property might affect the size and structure of firms.  As in our 
previous work, we will consider how the transaction costs both for interactions between firms, 
and for interactions within firms, might be changed by the provision of such rights.  We 
recognize as we have previously, that firms are subject to a wide variety of influences, including 
a wide variety of legal influences that may change their transaction costs; intellectual property is 
by no means the only factor at work.
8
  The effects of ancillary rights in intellectual property may 
in many cases be overwhelmed by other cost factors.  However, we believe that ancillary rights 
in many other cases may be at least a significant factor affecting the costs a firm will experience, 
and we offer an analysis of plausible outcomes from such cases. 
 
 
II. Intellectual  Property and the Firm 
 
 In order to consider the effects of ancillary intellectual property rights on the firm, we 
must first briefly sketch the role of intellectual property within the theory of the firm, which in 
turn requires that we review some basic concepts regarding the theory of the firm itself.  Coase 
argued that firms exist as islands of conscious, hierarchical decisionmaking within a market 
milieu, and which reduce the transaction costs of productive activity and exchange.
9
  Although 
market competition may push productive activity toward efficient levels, the search, negotiation, 
and bargaining that are necessary to market transactions are themselves costly activities.  
Organizing activity deliberately within a firm creates its own costs of search, bargaining, and 
coordination, but at times direction of productive activity by a manager will prove to be less 
costly than continual bargaining.  Even if such direction is does not always track market levels of 
efficient production, it may nonetheless achieve a local cost minimum by avoiding the 
transactions costs of marketplace activity. 
 
 This insight leads quickly to the corollary concept that the size and structure of firms will 
be a function of the differential between the costs of marketplace transactions and the costs of 
managerial direction.  When deciding between producing a good itself, or procuring it in the 
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marketplace -- the so-called “make or buy” decision -- firms will consider the transaction costs 
of each option. When market transaction costs are relatively low, the firm will negotiate to 
outsource production.  When market transaction costs are relatively high, the firm will bring 
production within the lower cost structure of the firm.  If firms decide to produce the good 
themselves, they grow larger to accommodate the additional activity; when they outsource 
production, they will grow smaller. 
 
The concept of transaction costs is broad and elastic (a polite term for vague).  It includes 
the costs of identifying parties to a transaction, bargaining to reach an agreement, and enforcing 
the agreement reached.  The literature on transaction costs is vast, but key structural elements 
which help define transaction costs include asymmetric information possessed by different 
parties, the difficulty of writing complete contracts in all but the simplest of situations, and the 
specificity of assets to particular uses and relationships.  Markets and firms govern transactions 
in different ways, and create different sorts of opportunities for strategic interactions between the 
parties to those arrangements, thereby creating different kinds and levels of transaction costs.  A 
transaction cost theory of the firm posits that the boundaries of firms adjust to minimize the total 
transaction costs required to engage in the transactions needed to produce a related set of goods 
and services.  Note that a focus on transaction costs oversimplies. Broad and elastic though the 
concept may be, it does not include all types of costs.  The boundaries of firms may affect other 
types of costs as well, including production costs, i.e. the direct costs involved in transforming 
inputs into outputs.  A more general theory of the firm would consider how firm boundaries 
affect all types of costs.  However, following Coase, much of the best and most influential theory 
of the firm has focused on minimizing transaction costs.
10
  We follow that transaction cost 
approach, which still has much to teach us in understanding the relationship between law and the 
structure of firms. 
 
 A second corollary concept involves the role of law in lowering transaction costs.  In 
particular, many commentators have recognized that property rights are a key component to 
lowering transaction costs between firms in the marketplace.  Transactions can be structured 
around contracts that lower the uncertainty of an exchange, and that can penalize strategic 
behavior.  But contracts are necessarily incomplete, and cannot cover all possible 
contingencies.
11
  Indeed, some commentators have shown that there may be strong incentives for 
business partners to attempt to hold one another up, seeking extra concessions outside the 
original contract once the other party has committed resources to a project and those resources 
have become difficult to redeploy.
12
  Property rights help to define who has the right to control 
and redeploy resources when deals go sour and contracts fail to specify how the resources are to 
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  Firms that can rely on residual property rights will be more willing to enter 
alliances with one another, knowing that they are protected by property rules in the event of a 
contract failure.  Thus, one view of the firm is as a repository of residual property rights that 
determine the allocation of resources in the absence of some contractual allocation. 
 
 Of course, incomplete contracts and strategic behavior may raise transaction costs within 
firms as well.  Employees may shirk their duties, or take advantage of the employer, especially at 
opportunities that may have been overlooked or unforeseen when their employment contracts 
were negotiated.
14
  Property rights may serve as a default to fill such gaps in the terms of 
employment.  Employee contracts might not include clauses that specifically constrain 
employees from pilfering office supplies, or from use the company photocopier for personal 
matters, but property rights dictate the proper disposition of such resources.  Property law in such 
instances dovetails with corporate and employment law principles of fiduciary duty that require 
employees to use the firm’s resources for the firm’s purposes.
15
  Property rights help delineate 
which resources belong to the firm, and so which resources are subject to such duties. 
 
 More recently, scholars have increasingly recognized that the conception of the firm as a 
repository of residual property rights encompasses not only to tangible property, but intellectual 
property as well.
16
  Many of the most valuable and critical assets of modern firms fall into the 
category of intangible or informational assets: goodwill, know-how, customer lists, business 
plans, industrial processes, product innovations, software, and so on.  Such assets are legally 
secured by intellectual property regimes under the law of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and 
trade secrets. Consequently, several scholars have suggested that intellectual property may be 
important to lowering the transactions costs between firms in the market place.
17
  Proprietary 
information, once revealed in the course of negotiations, is easily misappropriated by a potential 
business partner.
18
  Contractual restrictions on such strategic behavior will always be incomplete, 
as contracts can never anticipate every contingency.  In the absence of some property right, firms 
may be reluctant to disclose or license their intangible assets.  Intellectual property regimes such 
as patent and copyright law may be crucial to deterring strategic misappropriation, and so 
encouraging more transactions. 
 
 A related but distinct line of scholarship has also suggested that intellectual property 
rights will often serve to lower transaction costs within a firm.  Paul Heald has argued that 
patents will facilitate team production, by reducing the costs of monitoring and tracking 
employee work to prevent employees from shirking their duties.
19
  Intellectual property also 
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helps to demarcate firm assets that may be difficult to distinguish from employee assets.  
Regimes of trade secrecy, copyright work made for hire, and patent assignment will tend to 
clarify firm ownership of intangible assets, and help separate employee’s general human capital 
from firm specific capital.
20
  This may promote employee mobility by distinguishing ideas and 
know-how that may be ported to a new employer from that which should remain with a previous 
employer.  Both employees and potential new employers can be less apprehensive about 
inadvertent misappropriation of intangible goods. 
 
 But because the boundary of the firm is determined at least in part by the differential 
between internal and external transaction costs, the cumulative effect of intellectual property 
across both sets of costs must be considered in assessing the effects of intellectual property on 
the firm.
21
  The changes in transaction costs induced within the firm by intellectual property may 
be either augmented or offset by concomitant changes in transaction costs between firms.  The 
optimal intellectual property regime for firms will be the one that minimizes the combination of 
transaction costs between firms and transaction costs within the firm.
22
  Such minimization will 
move the firm toward optimal size; optimizing costs in only one dimension may result in firms 
that are inefficiently large or inefficiently small. 
 
 Additionally, we have argued that an intellectual property regime which is too strong may 
be as detrimental to the size and structure of firms as an intellectual property regime that is too 
weak.
23
  An anemic internal intellectual property regime may allow employees to divert or 
misappropriate the firm’s intellectual assets, but an overly stringent intellectual property regime 
within the firm may hamper employee creativity and productivity, driving the most valuable 
employees away.  Similarly, an anemic external intellectual property regime exposes the firm to 
strategic behavior by its business partners, but an overly stringent external intellectual property 
regime hampers production by complicating license negotiations and restricting the firm’s 
freedom to operate.  Thus, intellectual property is not an unmitigated benefit to the firm; there 
can be too much of a good thing.   
 
 
III. Ancillary IP Markets 
 
 Analyses of IP and the firm have to date focused on what we might term the primary or 
core grant of intellectual property.  In various forms of intellectual property, rights inhere in a 
particularly defined juridical artifact.  In patent law, this is the invention as defined by the 
patent’s claims. But patent law also routinely grants exclusive rights that are not within the 
definition of the core or primary grant of the intellectual property.
 24
  A typical instance is found 
in the rights associated with contributory infringement. These ancillary or related rights differ 
from the primary right because they are not necessarily associated with the defined artifact to 
which core rights attach.  Often such right will be designated as a type of “indirect 
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infringement.”  Such ancillary rights confer exclusivity in a different market than that of the core 
intellectual property grant. 
 
 A useful way to think about the primary and ancillary rights in intellectual property is to 
adopt a market based view, a definitional approach familiar from areas such as antitrust law.
25
  
Primary or core intellectual property grants tend to apply horizontally across a market or across 
closely overlapping markets for duplicate or similar goods.
26
  Generally the markets in question 
may be defined in terms of substitutability; goods compete in the same market when one good is 
wholly or largely a substitute for the other.
27
  Exact copies of a copyrighted work, patented 
device, or protected mark are clear market substitutes.  Similar copies or variations of these may 
also be substitutes, which is why intellectual property rights in a given work, device, or mark 
typically extend to close variants. 
 
 In this article we are concerned with rights, often attached to the core right, that tend to 
apply non-horizontally – that is, across markets for dissimilar goods that are not substitutes for 
one another.
28
  In many cases such ancillary rights will apply to complementary goods that will 
experience price and demand variations in parallel with the goods covered by the primary 
grant.
29
  In some cases, these will be vertical inputs to the production of the artifact embodying 
of the core intellectual property; in other cases they will be complementary products for use with 
the product embodying the intellectual property. 
 
 We recognize that these divisions between vertically and horizontally oriented rights are 
typical, not universal, and not pristine.  For example, it is entirely possible that in some 
instances, patent claims may encompass embodiments of an invention with applications in 
different markets.  But in such cases, each of the embodiments, within its own market, is quite 
distinct from and not a substitute for a contributorily infringing device.
30
 The core property right, 
even when it stretches across multiple markets, remains distinct from an ancillary right that is not 
contemplated in the claims.   
 
A. Contributory Infringement Doctrine 
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 Perhaps the clearest example of such ancillary goods is found in American patent law’s 
contributory infringement doctrine.
31
  Patented inventions are defined by written claims that 
attempt to describe the subject of the patent by setting forth the component parts of the invention 
and their relationship to one another.
32
  Among other doctrinal uses, the claims are employed to 
determine patent infringement.  The text of the claims is compared to the accused device;
33
 every 
element of the textual claims must be found in the accused device, in the claimed relationships, 
to reach a finding of infringement.
34
  A different set of components in the same relationships, or 
the same components in a different relationship, would not be described by the literal language 
of the claims, and so would not infringe the patent, as they would constitute a different device or 
process than that in the patent.  Only if a device or process constituting all the elements of the 
claims is made, used, sold, offered for sale, or imported without authorization
35
, has infringement 
occurred.   
 
 This stricture of patent law provides the opportunity for mischief on the part of potential 
infringers.  By selling components of a patented invention that are in a different relationship than 
that specified by the claims – for example, by selling the components disassembled – the seller 
avoids infringing the formal language of the patent.
36
  Selling components is not making, using, 
selling, offering for sale, or importing the claimed invention, because the individual components 
are not in the relationship required under the patent claims: they may be a collection of parts to 
the claimed invention, but they are not the claimed invention.  The invention only comes into 
existence when the components are placed in the relationship required by the claims – perhaps 
when assembled by a purchaser of the components.  A purchaser who assembles the components 
becomes the infringer, “making” the claimed invention, but the seller of the components has not 
made or sold the invention. 
 
 Congress has responded to this potential loophole by making such preparatory activity an 
infringement of the patent – an indirect rather than a direct infringement.
37
  The statute 
recognizes that a vendor can potentially aid and abet patent infringement without directly 
infringing the patent holder’s exclusive rights, and such activity is penalized.  The making, using, 
selling, offering, or importation of the claimed invention by someone further down the stream of 
commerce triggers contributory liability on the part of the upstream vendor who enabled the 
patent infringement.  Direct infringement by one party triggers contributory liability of another.  
 
 But this creates a serious potential problem: every hardware store, electronics shop, or 
similar vendor of parts routinely sells components that can, and perhaps are, used to infringe 
patents.  Patented inventions may well be comprised of stock components that are commonly 
available.  Many “dual use” items may have infringing uses as well as perfectly legitimate, 
innocent uses.  The vendor may have no way of knowing to what use a piece of hardware will be 
put.  It would be counterproductive to impose liability for contributory infringement on any 
merchant selling stock items that were eventually misused by a purchaser – the liability of the 
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vendor would depend on the use to which the purchaser put the item.  Vendors would be put to 
the burden of attempting to determine the use to which an item was to be put, or eliminating 
from their stock myriad standard “dual use” items.  Legitimate sales of common, useful items 
would be deterred for fear that they might be diverted to infringing uses. 
 
 The statute solves this dilemma by differentiating between “dual use” items that might 
have both infringing and non-infringing uses, and those that clearly have only infringing uses.  
The former class of items is referred to as “staple articles of commerce”; the latter is designated 
as items that are “specially made or adapted” for use with a patented invention.
38
  Selling “staple 
articles of commerce” is not considered contributory infringement, even if such items are 
eventually put to an infringing use.  The vendor is not tasked with determining how common or 
standard components will be used.  But selling components that are specially made or adapted to 
be used with the patented invention, without the authorization of the patent holder, constitutes 
contributory infringement.
39
  Since such items have essentially no use other than to infringe, the 
vendor knows or should know that they are likely to be used for infringement. 
 
 The net effect of this provision is that the patent holder accrues exclusive rights not only 
over the claimed invention described in the patent, but over any article specially made or adapted 
for use with the claimed invention, even though those items are not the subject of the patent.
40
  
The articles that could trigger contributory infringement liability are not vetted by the Patent 
Office for patentability; they may be obvious or anticipated or otherwise fail the statutory and 
constitutional requirements for a patent.  They are not patented but they are nonetheless 
effectively covered by the patent: the patent owner can exclude others from dealing in such 
items.  This of course implies that the patent owner can also authorize others to deal in such 
items.   In order to make this extension of the patent right perfectly clear, Congress has explicitly 
provided in the statute that patent holders may manufacture such items, or license or refuse to 




B.  Doctrinal Limitations 
 
 This extension of the patent holder’s rights beyond the patent can lead to somewhat 
counterintuitive results.  The limiting case for the contributory infringement right is likely found 
in the Supreme Court’s decision in Dawson v. Rohm & Haas.
42
  The plaintiff in Dawson held a 
patent on a method of weed control, consisting of application of the chemical propanil as an 
herbicide.
43
  Propanil could only be used as an herbicide as provided under the patent; it had no 
other known use.
44
  A patent on propanil itself had previously been challenged in court and 
judged invalid because the chemical was found obvious in light of the prior art.
45
  Thus, the 
substance lay in the public domain, unpatented, unpatentable, and theoretically freely available 
for production and distribution by any chemical manufacturer. 
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 The defendant in the case had begun to manufacture and distribute propanil, and was 
sued by the patent holder for contributory infringement, on the theory that the substance was 
clearly specially made or adapted for use with the plaintiff’s process patent -- the chemical had 
no use except for application as an herbicide as claimed in the process patent.
46
  The defendant 
argued that the substance it produced was unpatented and unpatentable, and that the plaintiff’s 
product patent could not be used to prevent manufacture of a substance clearly in the public 
domain.
47
  But the Supreme Court held that the process patent could lawfully be used in exactly 
that manner, to assert a contributory infringement claim to prevent unauthorized manufacture of 
a substance with no substantial non-infringing use.
48
  Thus, the process patent effectively 
encompassed the production and distribution of a chemical not covered by the patent, and which 
indeed could not be covered by any patent. 
 
 Much of the Court’s discussion in Dawson concerned the use of the 271(c) ancillary right 
in “tied” licenses.  The patent owner’s exclusive rights in specially made or adapted components 
can be asserted independently to allow or disallow production of such components.  However, it 
has often been used as the basis for bundled licenses, which conditions licensing or purchase of a 
patented invention on license or purchase of the components associated with the contributory 
infringement right.  Tying of a patented item to an unpatented item, even one specially made or 
adapted for use with the patented item, was long viewed with suspicion.
49
  This disfavor arose 
from a general animus in the early Twentieth Century against patents as constituting monopolies, 
and against tying as an anticompetitive attempt to extend the monopoly.  Courts frequently found 
the bundling of such goods to constitute patent misuse, that is, an illegal attempt to leverage the 
exclusive rights of the patent beyond the intent of the patent grant.
50
  Sometimes assertions of 
contributory infringement other than tying were also held to constitute misuse.  
 
 Frequent judicial invalidation of licenses for bundled goods led to complaints to Congress 
by patent owners, and so to the enactment of the statutory provisions explicitly approving the 
manufacture, licensing, and enforcement of exclusive rights related to specially made or adapted 
articles.
51
  Additionally, tying of patented and unpatented items was statutorily defined to 
constitute misuse only if the patent holder had market power in the patented item.
52
  This is 
essentially the antitrust standard for tying, although the statute does not explicitly equate misuse 
with an antitrust violation.
53
  Antitrust violations involving a patent are by definition also misuse 
of a patent, but the statute seems to suggest the converse proposition: that, at least for tying 
arrangements, misuse is defined by the standard of an antitrust violation.  On its face, the 
statutory language is potentially somewhat broader than this; it is certainly possible to possess 
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market power without committing an antitrust violation, so that the class of possible misuses can 
be broader than the class of antitrust tying violations.  But close identification of misuse with 
anticompetitive activity by the judiciary has largely relegated patent misuse to an uneasy 





IV. Ancillary IP and Transaction Costs 
 
 Ancillary rights such as those found in contributory infringement tend to arise in contexts 
that seem primarily directed toward accommodating enforcement of the primary rights: the 
ancillary right often seems intended to deter clever infringers from “aiding and abetting” the 
direct infringement of the primary right.
55
  This strategy implicitly recognizes that enforcement 
of an intellectual property right is itself a costly activity, requiring an investment of resources to 
detect and deter infringement.
56
   Direct infringement may be highly diffuse, occurring among 
myriad end users, perhaps in private or secluded settings.  Ancillary rights may simplify the 
rights holder’s job of detecting and policing the primary right, by focusing on activity upstream 
from the direct infringement, where perpetrators may be fewer and easier to locate.   
  
 Without dismissing this as a possible justification for contributory infringement, we 
expect that such rights will change the transaction cost profile for firms holding patents, and so – 
intentionally or not – may impact the size and structure of firms.  Consequently we turn to 
consideration of how deployment of ancillary rights may either increase or ameliorate transaction 
costs experienced by firms.  As in previous work, we examine effects on both inter-firm and 
intra-firm costs, starting with the former. 
 
A. Inter-firm Costs 
 
 Our previous papers examining the transactions costs effects of primary allocations of 
intellectual property suggested that, although having some such rights will facilitate bargaining, 
property rights are not an unmixed blessing.  At some point the ubiquity and scope of intellectual 
property could serve to increase transaction costs between firms, through the formation of an 
“anti-commons”
57
 or similar rights “thickets”
58
 that impede a firm’s ability to locate and 
negotiate with all the necessary parties.  We expect that the benefits of ancillary rights will 
similarly be subject to diminishing returns; indeed, the danger may be greater in the case of 
ancillary rights.  Since ancillary rights lie outside the established boundaries of a primary 
intellectual property grant, and potentially encompass multiple items of differing subject matter, 
their potential for creating a stifling thicket of rights may be particularly high. 
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 In a related vein, we note that the effects of ancillary rights, especially those involving 
complementary goods, will be most noticeable in relatively pristine negotiations, where the 
interests of multiple parties do not produce coordination or hold-out costs.  Such situations may 
be found in actual settings where the owner of a primary right, such as a patent, dominates an 
industry, or where producer interests are coordinated through an industry association.  For 
example, the need for developing and promulgating technical standards often facilitates such 
associations.  
 
 It should be apparent that such conditions, where negotiations can be relatively simple, 
are also conditions that will be a matter of concern under antitrust and related competition law.  
We have already noted above the usefulness of adopting a view of ancillary rights drawn from 
the antitrust view of vertical and horizontal market complementarity.  While our focus here is on 
intellectual property rather than antitrust, certain aspects of antitrust analysis, particularly 
analysis of tying arrangements, are important to the discussion of ancillary rights.  For example, 
we think it significant that, in patent law, overreaching assertions of contributory infringement 
were long constrained by patent misuse doctrine, which bears pronounced characteristics of 
competition law.
59
  Congressional judgment that misuse itself was being applied too liberally led 
to statutory curtailment of the doctrine
60
, but tying arrangements involving the contributory 
infringement right in patents remains limited by a market power standard drawn from antitrust.
61
  
Antitrust analysis is pertinent in determining what forms of tying might be efficient and 
permissible for other forms of intellectual property as well.   Thus, antitrust metrics help to 
identify those situations where ancillary rights may alter a firm’s “make or buy” decisions. 
 
 Tying complements 
 
 Much of the antitrust competition analysis of ancillary rights has focused on the practice 
of tying or conditioning licenses for patents or other intellectual property on acceptance of an 
accompanying license to articles falling under the ancillary right.  Exclusive licensing of 
complements, or suits to curtail unauthorized production of complements, have historically been 
viewed as a bid by the producer of a primary good to illegitimately extend the economic leverage 
of a patent into adjacent markets.
62
   
 
Neo-classical economic analysts have more recently asserted that in general such tying is 
relatively innocuous.
63
  These commentators have argued that there is only a single rent that can 
be extracted for a given product; the buyer has a certain willingness to pay and no more.  The 
rent extracted from the buyer might be divided in any number of ways; in the case of tying, it 
might be divided between the tying product and the tied product; the tying product might be 
priced at any amount from zero up to the full willingness to pay, and the tied product might be 
priced at any complementary amount from zero up the full willingness to pay.  But in any event 
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the buyer’s willingness to pay for the package remains the same, no matter how the prices in the 
package are allocated.  On this view, tying cannot extract any greater payment than could be 
extracted in the absence of tying. 
 
 Tying arrangements have instead been argued to constitute beneficial licensing 
mechanisms to allow metering and price discrimination.
64
  Drawing an example from the 
famous, perhaps infamous, protracted IBM antitrust litigation, a seller or licensor of a mainframe 
computer system might occasion the license on an exclusive agreement for the licensee to 
purchase punch cards from the computer vendor.
65
  Punch cards were used in earlier computer 
systems as a means of encoding data or programs; information would be physically read by the 
computer hardware from holes in the card.  Punch card usage thus provided a metric for 
monitoring equipment usage; the more punch cards that were being used, the more data that was 
being processed by the licensee.   Licensees who used more punch cards were using the licensed 
equipment more, presumably valued it more, and could be charged a higher price, either directly 
as a payment for the computer system, or indirectly by means of punch card sales. 
 
 On this view of price discrimination, tying certain complementary products, or certain 
inputs, to a patent license in order to facilitate monitoring may in some cases facilitate optimal 
firm size.  Firms downsize and outsource when market conditions are favorable.  Uncertainty 
over price, and protracted strategic posturing over licensing terms, can contribute to the costs of 
market transactions, inhibiting outsourcing.  Negotiations in the marketplace may be hampered 
by uncertainty over a licensee’s valuation of the license; licensees may even strategically attempt 
to obscure their actual valuation.  Conversely, better pricing information would lower the cost of 
licensing, potentially decreasing firm size.  Firms would be better able to outsource productive 
activity if they are better able to gauge the correct price or royalty stream for a product.  Tying 
products together in order to facilitate monitoring may make the value of a license to a licensee 
more transparent, or at least allows the licensor to defer the valuation problem to the future, 
where it will be revealed by the licensee’s behavior. 
 
 However, tying ancillary goods for monitoring purposes may be a complex factor in 
determining firm size.  Price discrimination allows firms to increase their revenue, by identifying 
the willingness to pay of different groups of customers, and extracting the maximum price from 
that group, rather than taking an average price from all groups.
66
  This increased revenue, in turn, 
may facilitate the addition of more in-house production capacity.  Firms may grow inefficiently 
in response to revenue increases, wastefully building in-house capacity when overall welfare 
would benefit from more outsourcing.  Thus, in some cases, it may be that price discrimination 
affects firm size ambiguously, or even detrimentally. 
 
 Quality control 
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 Antitrust analysis of tying has suggested additional compelling and legitimate reasons for 
the producers of primary goods to wish to control the provision of complementary goods.  In 
particular, the producer of the primary good may wish to ensure that the complementary goods 
meet certain quality standards.
67
  Substandard complements may in some cases cause poor 
operation or failure of the primary good, and if such malfunctions become associated with the 
primary good, the reputation of the primary good producer  may be impaired.  At a minimum, the 
primary good producer may expend resources dealing with customer support and complaints 
over malfunctions. The best way to avoid such difficulties may be to closely oversee and control 
the production of complementary goods – possibly through licensing, or possibly through direct 
production by the primary producer.  Either option requires eliminating other unsupervised 
sources of the complements from the market. 
 
 Of course firms might instead publish or provide to other firms specifications for 
complementary devices, but this strategy may be unavailing in a variety of situations.
68
  First, a 
number of commentators have noted that certain types of knowledge may be “sticky,” which is 
to say difficult to transfer or codify for publication.
69
  This type of knowledge tends to remain 
tacit, that is, carried by persons as skills or in personal memory.
70
  If the production of 
complementary products is dependent on this type of knowledge, provision of specifications may 
be incomplete, leading to sub-optimal complements.  Here the “specially made or adapted” 
criterion for contributory infringement becomes important.  If a component is specially made or 
adapted for use with the patented device, then there is a much higher likelihood that the patent 
owner possesses information, perhaps tacit, or “sticky,” or proprietary, regarding the proper 
specification of that component.  There is far less reason to believe this is the case for staple 
articles of commerce that have dual or even multiple uses, which could be known or divined by 
multiple producers. 
 
 Second, even if firms are able to fully codify the specifications of complementary 
products, they may be reluctant to do so due to issues of trade secrecy.
71
  Proper provision of 
complementary products may require access to proprietary information, either regarding the 
complementary product or regarding the primary product itself.  Open publication of the 
standards would in this instance be either incomplete, or would require disclosure, and so loss, of 
the information’s proprietary status.  In order to maintain the status of the trade secrets, 
confidentially licensed disclosure would be required.  While it is certainly possible to pursue this 
alternative, successful trade secret licensing tends to be a highly cumbersome process, with 
potentially adverse effects on the size and structure of the licensing firm, as we have discussed at 
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 Third, and perhaps most significantly, even if provided with full specifications for the 
complementary products, unsupervised third party providers may be tempted to scrimp on the 
quality, support, or maintenance of complementary products.  This type of curtailment can most 
likely be expected where the failure or defect in the complementary product will tend to reflect 
on, or be attributed to the primary product.  Third-party producers have no particular investment 
in the reputation or viability of the primary product’s producer, and may in effect free-ride off 
the primary producer by shifting the costs of diminished quality, while accruing the savings from 
substandard production.  
 
 The problem of low quality complements may be exacerbated in situations where the cost 
of the failure does not fall on the purchaser of the goods.
73
  If failures or incompatibility caused 
by low-quality complements can be blamed on the primary product, or the cost of failure may be 
borne by the primary producer due to warranty, leasing, or policies to maintain customer 
satisfaction, then the purchaser may either have little incentive to search for high quality 
complements. Or, depending on the comparative cost and inconvenience of the failure, the end 
user may actually have some incentive to procure low-cost complements.  When the cost of 
replacement or repair can be shifted to the primary good producer, low-cost complements may 
be attractive even if they may prove sub-optimal or substandard, and third-party producers will 
of course be eager to supply them. 
 
 Primary producers may sometimes have the ability to contractually ameliorate such 
problems, for example by providing that the warranty is voided if unauthorized complements are  
used in conjunction with the product, or specifying that complements must be procured from 
particular sources – typically, either those supervised by the primary producer, or from the 
primary producer itself.  These types of requirements may be the subject of anti-trust tying 
scrutiny.
74
  Without delving at length into the detailed standards for such review, it is enough to 
note for our current analysis that there has in the past been considerable hostility to such 
arrangements, particularly in the patent context, although they now receive relatively charitable 
treatment.
75
  In the case of patent contributory infringement, the ability to tie the primary product 
to complementary products has received the statutory imprimatur of Congressional approval
76
, 
but tying in general has become subject to a rule of reason analysis that would accept a showing 
of plausible grounds for tying. 
 
 Even under circumstances lending themselves to favorable anti-trust scrutiny, the 
problem of incompleteness may frustrate contractual solutions. Ancillary rights may provide an 
important default component in ameliorating such perverse incentives, either to ensure that high 
quality complements are available in compliance with the warranty, or to control the availability 
and quality of complements where a warranty or explicit contract is not part of the primary 
product purchase transaction.  The potential for quality control afforded by ancillary rights may 
encourage firms to license out production of complements; firms may be smaller and 
complements may be produced by specialized firms. 
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 In the absence of an ancillary right – and assuming favorable anti-trust circumstances that 
would allow bundling of product and  complement
77
 – firms facing quality control problems 
might be forced to combat the quality control incentives outlined above by centralizing 
production of complements in-house, under direct supervision.  Complementary products could 
be produced to specification without difficult knowledge transfer, cumbersome licensing, or 
disclosure of trade secrets.  However, to do so firms might be building in-house production 
capacity when that capacity were better licensed out. 
 
 Scienter effects 
 
 The statutory definition of contributory infringement limits the doctrine to purveyors of 
technologies lacking a substantial non-infringing use.  The Supreme Court has added an 
additional legal requirement that serves to buffer such actors from liability.  According to the 
Supreme Court, the statute must be read to require not simply a product specially adapted for use 
with the patented invention, but also a degree of knowledge regarding the patent, and of the 
potential of the complementary product to infringe.
78
  Given that the doctrine applies only to 
products that have no substantial use other than use with the patented item, awareness of the 
patent seems likely in most cases.  But knowledge of infringement creates a higher barrier; some 
end users may be authorized to use the product
79
, in which case no direct infringement will occur 
and so no contributory infringement can occur either.   
 
 The Supreme Court’s standard requires some knowledge as to which end users will be 
direct infringers and which will not in order for contributory infringement to attach.  Thus, firms 
that intend to produce specially adapted products would seem to have an incentive not to find out 
about the infringement status of their customers.  In some cases, firms may be able to defer the 
awareness necessary to trigger contributory liability until the time that they receive a cease and 
desist letter from the patent owner.   
 
Jonathan Masur has pointed out the strategic choice that this aspect of the doctrine has on 
a firm’s options regarding project-specific investments.
80
  In some situations, firms producing 
complementary products may have little incentive to identify circumstances of potential 
contributory infringement, depending on the specificity of production assets.  If the firm gains 
the necessary knowledge of the patent by means of an infringement notice from the patent 
holder, they will be in a poor bargaining position; any investment placed into project specific 
production capacity will be at risk of an injunction.  If the investment in specific assets is 
relatively low, or if the assets can be converted to another, non-infringing use, then the producer 
may choose to invest relatively little in determining its freedom to operate.  It may be rational to 
produce the complement unless and until served with the notice that would create knowledge of 
contributory infringement, then convert the assets to a different use. 
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 In a similar vein, Langinier and Marcoul have developed a formal model suggesting that 
formation of networks of suppliers may be deterred due to the contributory infringement rule.
81
 
Contributory liability depends on some level of knowledge
82
, so depending on the suppliers’ 
level of knowledge, contributory liability may be triggered once direct infringement on the part 
of the producer is shown.  In the face of such potential contributory liability, contractual 
relationships will form between a producer and suppliers only when the suppliers’ expected 
returns exceed the likely cost of infringement damages.
83
  Suppliers will avoid contractual 
relationships that might expose them to excessive indirect liability.
84
  The implications of this 
model are striking.  Although our primary focus has been application of the theory of the firm to 
intellectual property owners, this model suggests – perhaps not surprisingly -- that the provision 
of intellectual property rights affects not only the size and structure of rights holding firms, but 
of competing or supplying firms that are potential infringers.  In particular, one social cost of the 
contributory infringement rule may be to prevent potential infringers from outsourcing some 
productive activity – pushing them instead toward integration and development of internal 
capacity. 
 
B. Intra-firm Costs 
 
 Our analytic framework relates the relative magnitude of transaction costs across the 
boundary of the firm, considering the effects of intellectual property on both inter-firm and intra-
firm transactions.
85
  Having reviewed some likely effects of ancillary rights on external 
transaction costs, we now turn to considering effects on internal transaction costs, particularly 
the effects regarding employees.  We expect that ancillary rights may have a significant effect on 
the incentives and deterrents to employee departure. 
 
 Here again, as in our discussion of inter-firm transaction costs, trade secrecy provides an 
important backdrop.  Employee departure from the firm is one of the fundamental concerns of 
trade secrecy, which serves as a bulwark against employees leaving the firm with valuable 
proprietary knowledge, perhaps taking it to a competitor or using it to found a new firm.  But 
under some circumstances, it may be advantageous to a firm to have a departing employee 
develop a spin-out company that supplies the needed input, or a complementary good.  The 
departing employee knows the structure, processes, and culture of the parent firm.  A former 
employee, familiar with the methods and internal operations of the firm, is likely in the best 
position to create a new firm that can supply the needs of the firm.  No one is better equipped to 
develop and supply inputs that will meet the firm’s needs, not only technically, but 
organizationally and socially.  Firm managers will be aware of these potential synergies, and 
may encourage entrepreneurial employees to develop spin-outs.  Such employees might leave 
with the firm’s blessing, indeed, on occasion with the firm’s financial or technical backing. 
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 From the standpoint of the parent firm, this strategy combines certain advantages of in-
house production with the advantages of outsourcing production.  Rather than having to monitor 
the employee against shirking, allowing the knowledgeable employee to found a spin-out 
encourages her best efforts via the “high powered incentives” inherent in smaller firms.
86
  The 
fortunes of the departing entrepreneur are closely tied to those of the new firm, in all likelihood 
more so than to they were to those of the firm she is departing, and this alignment of interests 
will tend to promote full engagement.  The old firm may also be able to offload other costs of the 
start-up, such as capital and infrastructure financing, that it would have to undertake itself if the 
new firm’s production capability were developed in-house. 
 
 At the same time, the departure of the knowledgeable employee is a two-edged sword.  
Placing the employee outside the monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms of the firm creates 
some savings, but also entails potential costs.  The interests of the new entrepreneur may be 
strongly aligned with those of the new firm, but are not necessarily continually aligned with 
those of the old firm.  The newly independent entrepreneur may be in a better position to behave 
strategically.  Among other considerations, he is certainly in a position to divert firm-specific 
assets intended for the new venture to other purposes, perhaps supplying the input to competitors 
or developing other  products altogether. 
 
 The firm can to some extent adopt corporate structures to maintain control over the spin-
out, for example, by incorporating it as a spin-off subsidiary.  But tying the new firm too closely 
to the managerial control of the old firm may dampen the “high powered incentives” that could 
inspire the new entrepreneur.
87
  Alternatively, the firm might, of course, attempt to forestall 
defection by means of contract.  Certainly the procurement agreement with the new supplier may 
say something about the uses to which insider information may be put.  Likely the departing 
employee’s personal employment contract says something conditioning the subsequent use of 
confidential information obtained while working at the firm.  But such agreements are not 
always enforceable, either as a legal or a practical matter.  And, since, as we have outlined 





 Similar limitations may impede the firm’s ability to restrict the activity of former 
employees via non-competition agreements.  Some jurisdictions, such as California, famously 
refuse to enforce such agreements at all.
89
  The law in jurisdictions where such agreements are 
enforced varies, but hampering a departing employee from her livelihood is always a concern.  
Frequently the standard for enforcement hinges on whether the restrictions are “reasonable” in 
duration, geographic scope, and subject matter.
90
  Non-competition agreements that are too broad 
in any of these dimensions may be invalidated.  A non-competition agreement that prohibits an 
employee from directly competing with the former employer may be considered reasonable, but 
an agreement that prohibits a former employee from working anywhere in an industry – for 
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example, from working in the production of inputs or products complementary to those of the 
former employer – may be less likely to be upheld. 
 
 Instead, maintaining some residual property right in the new firm’s product may better 
serve to deter strategic behavior and prevent diversion of the old firm’s intellectual capital into 
unrelated projects.  Ancillary rights will often give the original firm exactly such residual rights 
allowing them to exercise a degree of control over inputs or complementary goods produced by 
departing employees.  By promoting specialized spin-outs, such rights may facilitate the 
development of not only the spin-out firms, but also smaller and more entrepreneurial parent 
firms. 
 
 Ancillary rights may also have similar effects in the case of unsanctioned employee 
departures.  In many cases employees may have “insider information” on the newest and most 
valuable products being developed by the firm. Ancillary rights may help to curtail strategic use 
of such employee knowledge, particularly where employee obligations are unclear.  In the 
United States, the default rule has been that an employee hired to work on a particular project is 
required to assign inventions related to the project to the employer.
91
  Employees hired for 
general research or development may be required to assign the invention depending upon factors 
that include the use of the employer’s resources and the relationship to the employer’s line of 
business.
92
  Employees not hired for research or invention may have no responsibility to assign 
the invention.  Significantly, courts have tended to look to the actual activity and duties assigned 
to the employee after beginning work, rather than to representations made either before or at the 
time of hiring, to determine which of these categories applies in a given case.
93
   
 
Ancillary rights such as the contributory infringement rule may provide a property default 
where such common law duties or contract fail to define the terms for assignment.  As one of us 
has suggested elsewhere, the employer has relatively little information about the new employee 
at the point of hiring, and may not be in the best position to anticipate how the employee’s time 
and talent may best be allocated within the firm.
94
  This may result in placement of inventive 
employees in positions where the inventions do not accrue to the firm. Employees who become 
familiar with the nature and characteristics of the firm’s products may depart with valuable 
information about the development of complements.  However, ancillary rights related to 
inventions held by the firm may allow control over complementary goods developed by 
employees, even in the absence of a right to assign. 
 
 But why impose such prohibitions on employee activity?  Perhaps the best rationale for 
allowing such impediments may be a Kitchian coordination story, by which ancillary market 
control prevents the “tragedy” of duplicative or wasteful racing to exploit markets adjacent to the 
claimed invention.
95
 The pre-allocation of the markets forestalls a race to colonize markets for 
specially made or adapted complements.  On this theory, placing monolithic control of the mark 
in the hands of a single owner allows orderly exploitation of the primary market by 
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synchronizing adjacent markets.  Employees holding” insider” knowledge are the most likely 
candidates to launch a complement race. 
 
 Nonetheless, reserving ancillary markets to the patent owner is not an unmixed blessing 
from the standpoint of social welfare.
96
 As in the case of insider securities trading, the 
prohibition on employee activity comes at a price, possibly a very high price.  Established firms 
may be ponderously slow to respond to emerging market demands.  Employees familiar with the 
characteristics of a forthcoming invention may be in the best position to benefit consumers in 
new markets; entrepreneurial opportunities outside the established firm might best harness the 
“high powered incentives” that would make new complements a reality.  We suspect that the 
balance between social benefits and costs will be different in different market sectors, but it 
seems likely that in at least some cases, the benefits of coordination may be outweighed by the 
costs of lost entrepreneurship. 
 
 At the same time, in the absence of a contributory infringement default rule, the next best 
alternative for a firm to capture the value of complementary goods developed from “insider” 
information is via contract, deploying a panoply of assignment provisions, trailer clauses, and 
noncompetition agreements.  These can be extremely off-putting to the creative employee, and 
may hamper firm growth by deterring desirable hiring.  The contributory infringement rule may 
serve to ensure firms have a stake in complements with the clearest relationship to their patented 







Our discussion of ancillary rights in this paper has been largely descriptive rather than 
proscriptive, in part because determining the efficiency effects of such rights is a tricky business.  
As should be apparent from the foregoing discussion, do not expect that a nuanced analysis of 
ancillary rights will easily allow them to be labelled a “good thing” or a “bad thing.”  They 
appear to be a good thing in certain instances, and a bad thing in other instances.  Consequently 
we conclude with a summary of the trade-offs and effects to be taken into account in assessing 
the overall efficiency and welfare effects of ancillary rights in a given instance. 
 
First, the expected effects sometimes point in different directions, as we have pointed out 
in the case of price discrimination.
97
  In general, scholars have tended to believe that outsourcing 
productive activities, leading to smaller dis-integrated firms, tends to be efficient; smaller firms 
are expected to be nimbler, more innovative, and more entrepreneurial.  To the extent that 
ancillary patent rights secure residual rights that might be captured by contract, encouraging 
firms to outsource specially made or adapted components rather than integrating their 
production, these rights may promote efficient firm sizing.  Similarly, to the extent that ancillary 
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rights encourage the type of employee spin-outs that we have described, these rights may tend to 
promote smaller and more innovative firms. 
 
 However, we have also pointed out above that ancillary rights may curtail some 
employee departures and some employee entrepreneurship.  This effect may discourage 
employees from joining a firm where they know their future opportunities may be restricted, 
preventing the firm from growing to its optimal size.  At the same time, lack of spin-out or other 
component suppliers may force the firm to integrate production of specially made or adapted 
components, pushing it toward becoming inefficiently large.  
 
It is unclear which of these trends will dominate firm sizing, but we expect this will vary 
according to the innovation profiles of different industries.
98
  Thus, in an industry where 
monitoring of licensed outsourcing is relatively and transparent, and transfer of technical 
information is relatively simple, the spin-out deterrent imposed by ancillary rights may exceed 
their its benefits.  Such idiosyncratic effects militate in favor of a flexible ancillary rights regime 
rather than a uniform regime.  Although exploration of such doctrinal accommodations is well 
beyond the scope of this paper, we note that legal oversight often does and should incorporate 
“policy levers” that can modulate the scope of the ancillary right – for example, the ability that 
we have described above for courts under section 271(d) of the American patent statute to take 




Additionally, our analysis here has drawn on previous explanations for the provision of 
ancillary rights.  Most of these justifications mirror various rationales advanced to justify core 
intellectual property rights, and so are subject to the same objections and caveats that bedevil the 
parallel arguments applied to rights in the core work: in general, the trade-off between the 
positive incentive effects of exclusive rights and the negative effects of restricted access to 
valuable innovation.  The literature on these issues is substantial and growing, although we have 
not plumbed it here.
100
  While we are sympathetic to concerns expressed regarding the current 
breadth of various ancillary IP rights, we  have taken their existence as given, to explore how, 
regardless of their justifications, control over ancillary markets has important implications for the 
structuring of firms – ancillary rights may contribute to the integration or disintegration of firms, 
to their efficiency or inefficiency.  And those implications may themselves offer justifications 
and concerns for the provision of rights in markets ancillary to core intellectual property. 
 
Finally, we note that some industries rely primarily on intellectual property rights other 
than patents.  In this paper we have focused on an example of ancillary rights within the patent 
system, but such ancillary rights appear in many parts of intellectual property law, not only the 
patent doctrine of contributory infringement, but copyright’s parallel doctrine of contributory 
infringement, copyright’s doctrine of derivative works, and trademark’s law of dilution.  As we 
have begun to demonstrate here, such ancillary rights can also be expected to have implications 
similar to those we have discussed for the size and structure of firms that hold intellectual 
property.   
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